Showing posts with label John Gasaway. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John Gasaway. Show all posts

Monday, February 7, 2011

Tuesday Truthiness

It's normally about this time of year that I make my annual blog post criticizing John Gasaway and his Tuesday Truths column (see here in 2009, and here in 2010).  And thanks to some recent articles posted at VBTN (link) and the HSAC (link), I reckoned it was time I get off my lazy duff and get to it.

But first, some background.

If you don't live in your mother's basement, you may not be aware that there is a very smart gentleman named John Gasaway.  Mr Gasaway himself lives in a basement, but it is the basement of the sports think tank called Basketball Prospectus.  From this secure location, he produces a series of articles called Tuesday Truths, which seek to bring knowledge to the ignorant masses.

To quote extensively from the master:
Over the next eight to nine weeks these 126 teams will play over a thousand possessions each. Half of those possessions will take place at home, and half of them will occur on the road. All of that basketball will be played against opponents that by conference affiliation have been designated as nominal equals in terms of programmatic resources. (Though, granted, a league like the A-10 certainly exhibits some notable diversity in terms of member heft.) And, not least, all of that basketball will take place in increasingly close temporal proximity to the NCAA tournament.

In other words, with all due allowance for injuries and funky scoring distributions, I look at these thousand-odd possessions very closely. And in leagues featuring true round-robin scheduling (Missouri Valley, Mountain West, Pac-10, and WCC, among others), per-possession performance in conference play tells me exactly how surprised I should be in mid-March when the league’s best team in tempo-free terms loses in first round of the NCAA tournament.
This per-possession performance is often termed efficiency difference [Off. PPP - Def. PPP] or net efficiency [Off. Eff. - Def. Eff.], and I'll use the terms interchangeably; the nuance is that eff. difference is just net efficiency divided by 100.  Also, to be clear, per-possession performance is not the same as my own Performance stat, which I continue to champion, albeit alone.


But all is not well between myself and Mr. Gasaway.

Tuesday, February 2, 2010

Conference efficiency margins and strength of schedule

A couple of my favorite basketball bloggers are big proponents of conference efficiency margin (what I normally call net efficiency).  Efficiency margin is simply the difference between points per possession scored and points per possession allowed.

Basketball Prospectus author John Gasaway, who may have pioneered this stat, offered a pithy explanation of it's utility last month:
Why track per-possession performance in league play?

Over the next eight to nine weeks these 126 teams will play over a thousand possessions each. Half of those possessions will take place at home, and half of them will occur on the road. All of that basketball will be played against opponents that by conference affiliation have been designated as nominal equals in terms of programmatic resources. (Though, granted, a league like the A-10 certainly exhibits some notable diversity in terms of member heft.) And, not least, all of that basketball will take place in increasingly close temporal proximity to the NCAA tournament.

And greyCat over at Villanova by the Numbers has been tracking these stats for the Big East biweekly, and in great detail.  Mr. Cat (I actually do know his name, but I'm not telling) also provided an important caveat before jumping into the numbers with his latest posting
I understand the argument against looking only at (for example) conference games -- the sample is too small, the schedule is unbalanced, the time-frame is too restricted, etc. etc. etc. -- all of which are valid points.

I actually took a look at this very point last season around this time, and it turned out to be more more informative than I realized at the time.  I'll come back to why that is at the end, but first I thought I'd re-run that analysis tonight.

I've compiled the strength of schedule for all Big East teams for conference games played so far (through Monday, Feb 1st), and plotted eff. margin against strength of schedule. Here, I'm using KenPom's Pythagorean rating (0-1), rather than his ranking (1 to 347) for the strength of schedule calculation.  The strength of schedule is weighted for home vs. road games.  The efficiency margin stats come from StatSheet.com.

Here we go (click to enlarge):



Just as we saw last year, there is a strong correlation between conference strength-of-schedule played to date and the efficiency margin posted.  So teams such as West Virginia and Villanova, which currently lead the league in efficiency margin are definitely getting some help from a soft early-season schedule, while Seton Hall is a bit below water thanks in no-small-part to a brutal start from the schedule-makers.

Now a bit of that effect is circular, in the sense that good teams don't have to play themselves, and therefore their schedules are slightly easier on average, while bad teams schedules are harder because they're missing an easy opponent (themselves).

However, in any league with an unbalanced schedule like the Big East, these effects are only one part of the overall scheme that won't entirely even out at the end.  For example, our own Georgetown Hoyas have been rewarded this year with home-and-away series with the current AP-ranked #2 and #3 teams.

Here's a table summarizing the conference season so far, and what's left for each team (rankings are from hardest to easiest):
.                      Current           Remaining          Exp. Final
Team                  SOS    Rank        SOS    Rank        SOS    Rank
Cincinnati           0.825    15        0.902    3         0.868    14
Connecticut          0.878    6         0.862    11        0.870    11
DePaul               0.913    2         0.823    14        0.875    6
Georgetown           0.867    10        0.876    8         0.872    10
Louisville           0.882    5         0.872    9         0.877    4
Marquette            0.890    4         0.819    16        0.858    16
Notre Dame           0.856    11        0.892    5         0.875    7
Pittsburgh           0.873    9         0.878    7         0.876    5 
Providence           0.812    16        0.936    1         0.888    1
Rutgers              0.910    3         0.838    13        0.879    3 
Seton Hall           0.919    1         0.819    15        0.872    9
South Florida        0.873    8         0.860    12        0.867    15
St. John's           0.877    7         0.864    10        0.870    12
Syracuse             0.851    12        0.885    6         0.869    13
Villanova            0.845    13        0.911    2         0.886    2
West Virginia        0.839    14        0.897    4         0.874    8 

Seton Hall has had the pleasure of playing the toughest Big East schedule so far, and are showing the effects with a 3-5 record.  They're path will get much easier, so expect them to make a push towards legitimacy.  DePaul and Rutgers have also had tough early-season slates, but I'd think the best they can hope for is just a step up from the absolute dregs of conference efficiency margin (anything worse than -20 is really bad).

Providence has a brutal second-half schedule, harder than what any team has played so far.  Many had pegged the Friars to be one of the worst teams in the league this year due to the loss of so many players, and that result may still be coming.  Meanwhile the Big East's Big Three (Villanova, Syracuse and West Virginia) have all benefited from relatively easy first-halves and should all see things get a bit tougher the rest of the way.  In fact, Syracuse may be in the best position of the three to win the regular-season conference title because of this.

It's also worth noting that the spread between easiest expected final schedule (Marquette) and hardest (Providence) is about the equivalent of the difference between playing U of Miami or UConn on a neutral floor, respectively (i.e. not really that much).


Finally, returning to that bit about what was so informative about last year's plot (reproduced below).  It turns out that teams that met two conditions went on to the NCAA tournament:
  1. They sat above the fitted line, i.e. were better than average, adjusted by schedule strength.
  2. They already had positive efficiency margins midway through the season.
So, right now, it looks like there are seven teams in good position for March (Villanova, West Virginia, Syracuse, Georgetown, Louisville, Marquette (!), and Pitt).  There are three other teams that meet only one of those criteria: Cinci, UConn and Seton Hall.

Here's last year's plot (from 24-Jan-09):

Friday, December 18, 2009

Distributions, and their meaning

This all started innocently enough.

Heading into the game against the Washington Huskies, I fully expected Georgetown to struggle mightily with turnovers, since Georgetown was turning the ball over on more than 22% of their possessions.  Against a high tempo team, I expected these turnovers to be turned into easy fast break points for the Huskies.

Turned out, Washington had a harder time holding on the ball than the Hoyas.  For the game, Georgetown outscored UW 28-23 on points after turnovers, as the Huskies ended fully 30% of their possessions with a give away.

Somehow, this got me to thinking about the four factors, scoring efficiencies and steals.  So I turned to KenPom.com and downloaded all of the end-of-season stats for 2004 through 2009, and starting playing around with the data.

Specifically, I was curious what the distribution of turnover rates were for teams in college basketball, as well as the median value.  While conference-only stats might be a bit more useful when looking at the Hoyas, they're a bit more tedious to generate (Pomeroy has done all the work for me for stats for all games), and his complete database has more than 2000 team-seasons, which makes statistical analysis much less susceptible to the occasional outlier.

An important point to keep in mind during this discussion is that I'm only looking at team-to-team differences, not game-to-game differences for a team, or player-to-player differences within a team.

First, I looked at the distribution of turnover rates (turnovers per 100 possessions).  Since we have TO rates for both offense and defense (i.e. turnovers committed and generated, respectively), I decided to compare histograms of the two, to see if the rate offenses turn the ball over varies equally to the rate defenses force turnovers (click any figure to enlarge).


The convention used here will be consistent throughout:  I created 25 equally-sized bins for a histogram, counted the number of team-seasons in each bin, then ran a Gaussian fit through each (assuming a normal distribution) to get the median and the width, really FWHM (full width at half of the maximum) which are reported next to the histogram.  The histograms are plotted offense on top, then defense on the bottom.

For turnover rate, the distributions look very similar, but not identical:  turnover rates by the offense is slightly broader and the median is a fuzz higher, while turnover rates by the defense are a bit narrower and the median lower with a strange tail extending to the right.  I suspect that this tail is due to a few coaches going all-out in attempting to force turnovers (think 40 Minutes of Hell), while most teams vary about the 17-24% range.  Since all teams try to prevent turnovers while on offense, that distribution looks a bit more classically bell-curve shaped.

This was all well-and-good, but frankly not very interesting, at least not yet.  Next, I ran steal rate (steals per 100 possessions):


At the top is the steals allowed while on offense, i.e. opponents' steal rate, while the bottom is steals generated while on defense.  Hopefully, these pairs of distributions look as different to you as they did to me.  The top plot (steals allowed) again has a much more symmetrical shape than the bottom (steals committed), and now it is much narrower.  I think that asymmetry on the bottom plot -the tailling on the right side - goes back to the idea that a few coaches will have their players constantly attempt for steals.  I'll discuss the difference in widths a bit more later on.

This got me thinking about two things - for now I'll just stick to the distributions, but if this post doesn't turn into a novella, I'll return to the other point (about turnovers and steals) at the end.

My next inclination was to wonder whether offensive and defensive efficiencies also show a difference in their distributions.  After all, all teams are trying to score and prevent the other team from scoring, so I'd expect that they'd be roughly the same. Here we go:


If you couldn't see much of a difference in the distributions in that last plot, I hope you see the difference here.  While both have a classical bell-curve shape, the offensive efficiencies are much more widely distributed than the defense.

So what does this mean?

When I looked at the difference between off. steals (allowed) and def. steals (committed), I noted that the defensive curve was broader.  The explanation is a bit complicated, but is as follows:
  • The stats were are looking at are "raw" or not adjusted for competition.  And each histogram is generated from the end-of-season stats for each team.
  • Therefore, each statistic is based upon playing a large number of teams (typically ~30 games) of varying talent and strategies.  So, when a statistic is a measure of some consistent team strategy (i.e. defensive steals), the distribution will be broad, since the statistic will be inflated or deflated expressly by strategy.
  • To demonstrate by continuing the example of defensive steals, a team like VMI has a very high steal rate which seems to be a fundamental component of their defense, while Washington St. has a very low steal rate as Tony Bennett eschews a gambling defense.  In each case, their opponents will allow more or fewer steals than normal because of the defensive strategy, and this accumulates over the course of 30 games.  By season's end, this consistent strategy results in a statistic (here steals rate) far from the median or average value.
  • Conversely, all teams try to minimize steals allowed.  Perhaps a certain offensive style is likely to lead to more steals for the defense, but offensive players on the court are always trying to prevent steals allowed.  Over the course of 30 games, they'll play against aggressive and passive defenses, so sometimes they'll have a high steal rate allowed, sometimes low.  But by the end of the season, they'll regress towards some median value.
  • When you extend this logic to all 2000 team-seasons, active strategies will result in a wider distribution than reactive responses.
This sounds reasonable to me, but can I prove this hypothesis?  We'll need to take a look at another stat where we can compare strategy to reaction by the offense and defense.  Thanks to a recent diatribe by John Gasaway, we know of another statistic:  rebounding.

Simply put, defensive rebounding is reactive - every team wants to get every rebound while on defense.  But offensive rebounding is strategic - some coaches will send 3 or 4 players to crash the boards on a missed shot, while others will send everyone back to prevent a fast break.

So if my thesis holds water, we'd expect offensive rebounding % to have a wider distribution than defensive rebounding %.  Let's take a look (here, I'll be using OR% and OR% allowed [= 1 - DR%] to make the distributions directly comparable):


And there it is, just as predicted.  The distribution of teams' offensive rebounding rate is wider than the defensive rebounding rate.

Feeling rather smug, I went ahead and ran all of the four factors (along with steal rate), summarized in this table:

.                     Offense                    Defense
Stat           Median  Width   W/Med      Median  Width   W/Med     Difference
Raw Effic.     101.0    9.7     9.6%      100.6    7.5     7.4%        2.2%
Adj. Effic.    100.2   12.8    12.8%      100.8   11.9    11.8%        0.9%

eFG%            49.0    4.4     8.9%       49.1    4.0     8.1%        0.8%
TO Rate         20.7    3.2    15.2%       20.5    3.1    15.0%        0.3%
O. Reb %        33.0    4.5    13.7%       32.9    4.0    12.3%        1.5%
FT Rate         35.5    7.0    19.6%       35.4    8.4    23.8%       -4.2%

Steal Rate       9.8    2.1    21.5%        9.7    2.4    25.0%       -3.2%

That column "W/Med" is simply the width divided by the median, as a way of normalizing the statistics to make them comparable.

The last column is the one of real interest, and is simply (Off. W/Med - Def. W/Med).  For the case of steal rate, the difference is negative, meaning that the relative width of the defensive distribution is wider, which we now know means that the defensive behavior is controlling the stat.  For rebounding percentage the value is positive, and so the offensive team has a greater impact.  Also note that the difference between offense and defense is more than twice as strong for steal rate as rebounding %, which seems reasonable.

The others:
  • Free Throw Rate:  The most strongly dependent upon the defensive strategy, more so than even steals.  I suspect here that the strategy of end-of-game fouling is dominating the stats; if I could re-run with just 1st half statistics, I wonder if the result would be so strong, or even the same.
  • Turnover Rate:  This is slightly more dependent upon the offense than the defense, but the difference is very small.  Essentially, the offense and defense are equally responsible for turnover rate.  In light of the strong dependence of steal rate on the defense, this may be surprising.  I'll have more to say about that at the end.
  • Effective FG%:  Again only a weak difference, but shooting accuracy is more dependent upon offense than defense.  This stat also may be opening up a second way to understand the difference column - while certainly offensive strategy (e.g. Princeton offense:  shoot only open 3s or layups) can help, I wonder if player skill is also being measured here.  That is, the ability to shoot accurately may be more important than the ability to defend shooters.
  • Raw Efficiency:  This most decidedly indicates that offense is determining efficiency more than defense.  The significance of this goes back to the eFG% remark, where I don't know if the stats are saying offensive strategy or offensive skill is the driver but I suspect both are involved.  This also is likely a cumulative effect of the first three factors (eFG%, TO Rate and O. Reb%) all correlating more with offense than defense.  The factors are listed in order of importance, so the strong influence of defense on FT Rate just isn't as important.
  • Adj. Efficiency:  For curiosity sake, I also ran KenPom's adjusted efficiencies, which is as close as I can get to conference-only stats using Ken's data.  Since the quality of competition is now accounted for, we see the offense-as-driver is much weaker.  The implication here is that when good teams play bad teams, offensive skill of the good teams dominates (assuming that all teams can implement strategy equally adeptly).  Since the rest of the stats are not adjusted for competition, this also may be telling us that all of these results would be weaker when teams of equal ability play.  This is to say, players' skill or relative athleticism may be more important than the coach's strategy, after all.

Near the start of this article, I mentioned that I had a second thread of thought about turnovers and steals:  I wondered how important steals were to turnovers.  The intuitive response is simply one-to-one since, after all, a steal is a turnover.  But I could rationalize other arguments:
  1. If a defense tries for a lot of steals, the offense would commit more other types of turnovers (5 seconds calls, throwing the ball out of bounds, etc.).
  2. If a defense tries for a lot of steals, there would be less other types of turnovers, e.g. errant passes would be more likely to be intercepted by a ball-hawking defense than allowed to sail out of bounds.
So, I simply plotted defensive turnover rate (TOs forced) versus defensive steal rate (steals committed):


The slope of the line is greater than 1, by about 20%.  This indicates that alternative hypothesis #1 is, in fact, the correct one.  Teams that force more steals also force additional turnovers beyond steals, so that they'll get 6 extra turnovers for 5 extra steals.

Interestingly, if I do this same plot using offensive turnover rates and steals (TOs and steals allowed), the slope of the line is exactly 1 (not shown).  Since we now know that steal rate is a defensive-dependent stat, I think the first plot is more valid, but I'm still thinking this through.

Finally, I can adjust both the offensive and defensive turnover rates for the steal rates, effectively creating a new stat [= TO Rate - Steal Rate * slope].  The temptation is to call this "Unforced TO Rate", but this would only make sense if the distribution analysis would show a very strong dependence upon offense rather than defense.  So, I ran the numbers

.                     Offense                    Defense
Stat           Median  Width   W/Med      Median  Width   W/Med     Difference
TOs-Steals      8.5     2.0    23.5%       10.5    1.9    17.7%        1.5%

This is what I'd call just a modestly pleasing result.  If I remove the steals component out of turnovers, the offense is controlling "Unforced TO Rate" about as strongly as rebounding rate.

Frankly, I was hoping for more, but I suspect I am trying to push the statistics a bit harder than they will allow.

Saturday, March 21, 2009

Pace and Turnovers

No great insight in this post, I'm afraid, just a data dump.

First, a look at Georgetown's raw pace, both in all games and in conference regular season games only, during the JT3 era:
        Pace
Year All BE
2005 60.2 59.9
2006 59.0 58.6
2007 59.7 58.9
2008 62.1 62.3
2009 64.2 63.5

Next, back when John Gasaway was posting at Big Ten Wonk, he introduced a stat he called ePoss, or "effective possessions" which is simply a team's pace (possessions per 40 minutes) less the percentage of possessions on which they turn the ball over. Here's how those numbers have looked for the Hoyas:
        All games         Big East
Year ePoss TO Rate ePoss TO Rate
2005 47.0 21.9 46.6 22.3
2006 47.9 18.8 47.6 18.6
2007 46.6 22.0 45.6 22.6
2008 48.9 21.2 48.7 21.9
2009 50.3 21.6 49.5 22.2

From both sets of numbers, it's clear that the Hoyas played faster this year than they did last year, and that last year was faster than 2007. 2007 stands out, in ePoss terms, as a clear aberration in terms of being slow-even slower, in fact, than the nominally slower 2006.

If/when I come up with something interesting to say about these numbers, I'll put up a post accordingly. Other reader(s), feel free to come up with potentially interesting comments of your own.


UPDATE (3/26/09 2215 CT): Per request, I've updated the table with TO Rate for each year, broken down between all games and just BE conference play:

I'll put up a separate post with the numbers for Hoya opponents.

Friday, February 27, 2009

More on luck

I noticed a discussion of luck and consistency on HoyaTalk tonight, and that thread pointed to an article by John Gasaway on Basketball Prospectus.

Gasaway provides a list of top lucky and unlucky teams, based on winning percentage compared to net efficiency. This is something that I set up to track a while ago, but just have been too busy to get around to posting. Now that I've been scooped, I thought I'd just dump what I've got.

First, to define terms:
  • winning percentage is for conference play only, as are all following stats
  • net efficiency is simply the difference between offensive efficiency (points scored / 100 possessions) and defensive efficiency (points allowed / 100 possessions)
  • luck is the difference between actual winning percentage and expected winning percentage, based upon net efficiency
So how do we determine expected winning percentage? Well, there is a fairly strong correlation between net efficiency and actual winning percentage. Here are the actual winning percentage versus net efficiency numbers for the past five seasons (2005-2009) for the Big East:




I've colored the markers for this season (through 2/26) in blue, all previous seasons in red. The horizontal and vertical black lines represent the break-even points, either as net efficiency is zero or winning percentage is 50%.

The diagonal black line is the best linear fit to the data and the dashed blue lines are the 99% prediction bands - there is only a 1 in 100 chance that a team will lie outside of the prediction bands.

Teams that lay above and to the left of the fitted line are "lucky" in the sense that they have a better winning percentage than a team would expect to have based on net efficiency. And teams below and to the right of the fitted lines are unlucky.

The infamous 2006 Notre Dame team has been the unluckiest team in the five years I've run - they ended the year 6-11 (including a loss in the BET), but would have been expected to end up 10-7. Actually their expected won/loss record in the Big East was 9.7-7.3; I'm not a big fan of decimal wins and losses, but I'll use the extra significant digit to distinguish between teams (below).

That same year, the Syracuse Orangemen ran off four improbable wins in a row in the BET, which makes them the luckiest team in the last 5 years.

We can also glean a bit more from the graph:
  • While the conference is normally thought of as the Big 5 (UConn, Pitt, Louiville, Marquette and Villanova), the net efficiency rankings indicate that 'Nova may be just a bit behind those other four, and at about the same level as West Virginia.
  • It may not be apparant by winning percentage, but the efficiency stats indicate that there is a big jump between the top-12 teams in the conference and the bottom four (Rutgers, USF, St. John's, DePaul).
  • While there are some lucky and unlucky teams, this year there are not gross outliers either way - at least not yet.
  • It's always important to keep in mind that this analysis is for the conference season as a whole, and doesn't account well for injuries (D. James, J. Dyson, etc.).

Note: The actual method used by Ken Pomeroy (and probably John Gasaway) to calculate luck is based on Pythagorean winning percentage. The math is a bit more complicated, but the results are essentially the same as the graph presented above - the only big differences are for extremely good or bad teams, such as DePaul. For the table below, I'll use this more rigorous method.


Here's a table summarizing this year's teams, ranked by luck.
.                 Wins  Losses   Exp Win  Exp Loss   Luck
Cincinnati 8 7 5.6 9.4 2.4
Providence 9 7 7.1 8.9 1.9
St. John's 4 11 2.3 12.7 1.7
Villanova 11 4 10.4 4.6 0.6
South Florida 3 12 2.4 12.6 0.6
Louisville 13 2 12.7 2.3 0.3
Marquette 12 3 11.7 3.3 0.3
Seton Hall 6 9 5.7 9.3 0.3
Connecticut 14 2 14.1 1.9 -0.1
Pittsburgh 12 3 12.6 2.4 -0.6
Notre Dame 7 8 7.7 7.3 -0.7
DePaul 0 15 0.9 14.1 -0.9
Syracuse 8 7 9.1 5.9 -1.1
Georgetown 5 10 6.4 8.6 -1.4
Rutgers 1 14 2.5 12.5 -1.5
West Virginia 8 7 10.4 4.6 -2.4

As Gasaway says, Cincinnati, Providence and St. John's are the luckiest teams so far this season in the Big East, and Georgetown and West Virginia are amongst the unluckiest (for some reason, he left out Rutgers).

Sunday, January 25, 2009

Gasaway on the Hoyas

John Gasaway of Basketball Prospectus had a short post on Georgetown Friday, "Georgetown's Internal Bleeding."

Some highlights, annotated:
The Hoyas have now played a third of their conference slate. There’s plenty of season left to be played, of course, but in order to make something of that season GU will have to improve dramatically on defense.
I'd love to have a snarky rebuttal, but this is true. I've updated the season's Performance Charts through the West Virginia game, and the Hoyas have been consistently underwhelming on defense since the UConn game. That's six games in a row where the Hoyas have allowed more points than expected, based on venue and KenPom's season stats to date.
A month ago I remarked somewhat raffishly that Georgetown appeared to be inventing a new category: “outstanding defense without rebounds.” Well guess what. Turns out you need rebounds after all. In a conference with Seton Hall, the Hoyas can at least take solace in the fact that they will always be spared the indignity of being “last in defensive rebounding,” but the truth is their defensive rebounding is terrible.
For the season as a whole, Georgetown's defensive rebounding has been miserable at 61.7%, ranked 318/344 - worst amongst the BCS conference schools. Within conference play, Georgetown (56.9%) is just a fuzz better than Seton Hall (56.4%) which is worst. The comparison to SHU is particularly appropriate since the teams have 5 common opponents so far this season (UConn, NDU, Cuse, Provy and WVU). The only difference is that the Pirates have played Villanova (OR = 36.3%; 69/344) while G'town played Pitt (43.6%; 2/344).
There’s a sense at large that Thompson will right this talented ship and, who knows, that sense may be proven correct. But as of this moment Georgetown has been merely the tenth-best team in Big East play on a per-possession basis. Unthinkable on December 29, but true.
Here's where Gasaway is being a bit disingenuous - Georgetown may be tenth in efficiency margin [= points scored per 100 possessions - points allowed per 100 possessions], but they have played the hardest conference schedule to date, based on KenPom's ratings.

To look at this further, I've compiled the strength of schedule for all Big East teams for conference games played so far (through Saturday, Jan 24th), and plotted eff. margin against strength of schedule. Here, I'm using KenPom's Pythagorean rating (0-1), rather than his ranking (1 to 344) for the strength of schedule calc.



The blue line is a linear fit to the data. There is clearly a trend here - the harder a team's conference schedule so far, the worse their efficiency margin. If the fitted line is to be trusted - and I don't have any way of knowing if it should, beyond the fact that it is statistically significant at 95% - it implies that there are 6 top-tier teams in the Big East, once you account for the quality of opposition. Georgetown is one of them, along with Louisville, Pitt, Marquette, UConn and West Virginia.

One thing I'm not adjusting for here is home vs. road in evaluating strength of schedule, mostly because I'm not clear what the best weighting factor would be. It should be noted that Georgetown has played 6 conference games so far this season, with only 2 on the road.

A few other comments from looking at this chart:
  • Notre Dame is surprisingly (to me) below the line, implying that they are not a top-half team in the Big East.
  • Providence and South Florida are quietly hanging around in the second tier of Big East teams. The Friars aren't a big shock, as they were a darling pick to make the leap this year due to their experience; the Bulls may be reaping the rewards of Gus Gilchrist's eligibility.
  • The four worst teams are Rutgers, St. John's, DePaul and Cincinnati, in descending order. A few weeks ago, I had figured that Cincinnati was probably the 10th best team in the Big East, heading into conference play.
  • Seton Hall, today's opponent for the Hoyas, has played the 2nd hardest conference schedule to date - i.e. they may not be as bad as their current conference record indicates.

Tuesday, November 20, 2007

News: Mid-week Roundup

Thanksgiving week has been slow, but here are a few items:

  • Speaking of Louisville, the loss of David Padgett for at least 10 weeks will be a big test for the Cardinal players and Coach Pitino. Padgett quietly lead the nation in Offensive Efficiency last year (134.3, using 17.8% possessions in 58.9% minutes). To put him in Hoya context, Padgett's offensive value last year was roughly equivalent to the 2006 version of Darrel Owens, obviously with a different skill-set. Defensively-challenged Derrick Caracter and offensively-limited Terrance Farley will be nominally asked to take up the slack, but I think it's much more likely that Pitino will revert to what he knows best, namely going small and having his team take an enormous number of 3-pt shots.
  • While the amount of fawning I normally direct toward Ken Pomeroy and John Gasaway can be sickening, I have to point out a couple of posts on their website:
    • Gasaway finally posted his Big East Preview (Overview, Part 1, Part 2). You can read it for yourselves, but I just wanted to note that his main stipulations for Hoya success this season (improved def. rebounding and fewer turnovers) gibe with my own view. Both are better so far, but it's only 2 games in.
    • Pomeroy posted a strange article today about rating coaching performance; the premise of the article (that he can quantitatively evaluate coaching) is based upon the idea that all things regress toward the mean over time. Specifically, bad teams get better and good teams get worse the next season, so that "teams get pulled towards the .500 mark over time." This is based upon work Dean Oliver did with NBA teams, and Pomeroy applies this to college teams (with respect to their conference foes, not all of Div I). This strikes me as counter-intuitive for a couple of reasons. Certain teams are historically good (e.g. Duke, UNC, Kansas) or bad (e.g. Rutgers, Florida State, Colorado), at least in the short- to mid-term, and use this as a recruiting advantage within their conference. More importantly, the high turnover of talent in college seems likely to swamp almost any other effect. To this end, Dan Hanner (HP's new favorite blogger) has put together his own system ranking coaches, which is more interested in incoming talent and post-season results. It provides a nice alternative take to Pomeroy, who hopefully will come back to this idea of coaching evaluation again. Edited to add: Sure enough, Hanner chimes in on Pomeroy's article.
Finally, Ray Floriani is back. He sent me an e-mail yesterday with his tempo-free look at the Memphis-UConn 2k Classic Final; G'town will see both teams relatively early in the season.

NEW YORK CITY – The 2K Classic final turned out to be a gut check for both teams. Memphis stopped UCONN 81-70 in a hard fought contest at Madison Square Garden. The third ranked Tigers sprinted out of the gate and built an 18-3 lead. Slowly, possession by possession, UCONN battled back. The Huskies took a 41-40 lead into the locker room at the half.

The second half saw a tightly contested affair with the Tigers gradually pulling away over the final eight minutes.

  • eFG%: Neither team opted for threes (Memphis 3 of 13 and UCONN 1 of 5). The significance here lies in two point domination as Memphis, between size and penetration, was effective in the paint.
  • OR%: Both clubs hit the boards hard but allowing 48% of the possible rebounds to be gathered by the offense was just too much for UCONN to overcome.
  • TO Rate: Close and no shock as both teams were more than willing to push the ball.
  • FT Rate: UCONN’s ability to get to the line greatly aided the Huskies first half comeback. It also contributed to coach Cal’s first half technical. Basically, UCONN began running their offense and boxing out on the boards. These two factors contributed greatly to their ability to draw fouls. Actually this figure, though high, keeps in line with the three UCONN games prior to the final. Over those first three games the Huskies ft rate was 36%, which shows a good ability to get shots, or rebounding position, that can get them to the line.


UConn
Memphis
Pace 80
80




Eff. 87.5
101.2




eFG% 40.6%
48.5%
TO% 21.3%
21.3%
OR% 18.8%
48.6%
FT Rate
71.7%
30.4%





Stats courtesy of KenPom.com